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EASTERN

F.O.  
371

1947

PALESTINE

File No. 49

pp. 9696 to end

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

CLOSED  
UNTIL  
1978

61836

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E

2

1947

E 9696

17 OCT

PALESTINE

Ex. 411/16

Registry Number

E 9696/49/31

FROM

Brigadier  
t. Bayliss

No.

Dated

21/43/1. 9

Received in Registry

8 Oct  
18

Report conversation with Abdusrahman  
Pasha Agam on Oct. 6. at his request.  
In which he said he thought the  
Might seriously under-rated the strength  
of the Jewish forces.

Last Paper

9647

(Minutes.)

References

In P.P. Lox Thomas to LofP 16/10

Please see also E 9697

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Mr. Beeley New York.  
from Mr. Bukhows.  
✓ 18 Oct.

Egyptian Dept.  
31/10

J. E. Cable  
(J. E. CABLE)  
27/10

Mr. Sims  
Oct. 27

a good analysis of Agam Pasha's character.

R.P. Agam  
28/10

B.A.S.S.  
28.10

(Action completed)

J. E. Cable 27/10

(Index)

[Handwritten marks]

Next Paper

9697

38538

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FO 371 / 61836

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IC please  
BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE, <sup>for</sup>  
10, SHARIA TOLUBAT, /

8th October, 1947.

CAIRO. <sup>subm</sup>

31/43/1. G.

SECRET.

E 9696  
17 OCT

*by Michael Wright*

1. I forward herewith a report of a conversation I had with Abdurrahman Pasha Azzam on the 6th October at his request.
2. I have reported his remarks to the best of my ability as he made them and there will be noticed certain inconsistencies. For example when speaking of Palestine he thought that the Mufti, Haj Amin, seriously under-rated the strength and capability of the Jewish forces, and yet previously he forecast that in six months the Arabs would be able to settle the question.
3. The fact is that Azzam Pasha has very definitely two sides to his nature. One side, which is usually predominant when talking to Englishmen, is reasonable and moderate and when it is uppermost he is I believe perfectly sincere. There is, however, another side, far more emotional which is apt to take charge when his feelings are deeply stirred and especially when speaking to his fellow Arabs. It may be noticed for example that his utterances in London are far less provocative and more reasonable than those he allows himself to make in Egypt. He indeed admitted to me in the course of conversation that he had to take a line in the Middle East more extreme than he really felt in order to rally opinion to the Arab League, but that his own ultimate policy was to move in close parallel with British policy. He realised he said that it laid him open to criticism but believed it for the best in the end. This was his explanation of a diversity in utterances which I myself believe better explained by his somewhat volatile and emotional nature.
4. I am sending a copy of this letter and report of the interview to the Chief Secretary Palestine, the Embassy Cairo and to the Political Intelligence Centre. M.E.

*Yours sincerely  
Michael Wright*

Michael Wright, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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INTERVIEW WITH ABDURRAHMAN PASHA AZZAM.

1. At Azzam Pasha's request I went to see him yesterday afternoon (6.10.47) and had a conversation with him lasting two hours of which the following were the most important points.

2. EGYPT. Azzam Pasha said he had not had time to see many people and had not seen Nokrashi since he (Azzam) came back from London. (He only arrived in Egypt on 3rd Oct.). He, therefore, could say nothing as to the course events were likely to follow. But, he said, he felt the impasse now reached was an unnatural one. Over the Sudan he would like to see Great Britain, Egypt and the Sudanese get together, say exactly what each of them wanted and find a solution which he was sure would not be too difficult to do. Great Britain had certain interests and claims, the Sudanese wanted to move towards governing themselves and Egypt wanted to be sure that their water supply was secure and that developments would not be hampered. As regards the question of sovereignty, the Sudan was not ready for complete autonomy yet, but when they got it the existence of the crown need not tie them any more than it hampered Canada or Australia. Besides, was I sure that in 20 years' time there would be a monarchy in Egypt? He was not. It was probable that Saiyid Abdurrahman al Mahdi had had ambitions at one time for an independent kingdom but he thought that he was changing. Egypt he maintained needed some sort of alliance with Great Britain: there was nowhere else they could or wished to turn.

3. LIBYA. As regards the future of Libya he was not hopeful of its being granted independence, but he was himself coming round to the view that perhaps an international trusteeship, administered by one of the smaller powers such as Denmark or Sweden, which had no direct interest in the country would be better for the time being than independence, provided a definite term of say, 10 years was put to the trusteeship. It would eliminate chances of bad blood and friction between powers. Even an Arab League trusteeship would he though, impose too great a strain on the resources of the League and would tend to land them in conflict with, for example, the French.

4. PALESTINE. He was depressed about the future in Palestine and saw no chance of avoiding armed conflict between Arabs and Jews. He realised that H.M.G. meant to implement their statement that they were going to withdraw and that it was not a manoeuvre. (I assured him he was correct in this). He thought that the line taken in the Colonial Secretary's speech was a great piece of statesmanship and welcomed it, but what would happen when we had gone?. The Arabs now were anxious to avoid any trouble with the British - they looked on the Jews in Palestine as the possible enemies. Once we had gone he thought that the Jews would at once proclaim a state and set up a government: he understood that they had all

their /

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their plans ready for this. The proclaimed state might be over the whole of Palestine or over the part allotted to the Jewish State in the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority report. Even if it were only the latter there would be at least half a million Arabs in the Jewish State, in fact, he believed that if the Beduin were included in the calculation, there would be found to be just an Arab majority. There might be Arabs who for material reasons might be willing to accept this but he did not believe these reasons would outweigh their determination not to be subjects to a Jewish State. It was not permissible for any Moslem to accept this. There would be almost immediate revolt and immediate help sent by other Arab countries. There would be no question of any regular forces being sent but volunteers, arms and money would be sent and the Arab Governments would connive at and assist their despatch. It would be Spain over again. He feared that pogroms in Arab countries would be inevitable. The Jews, he thought, if the line they have been following against us is pursued, will adopt drastic measures which will produce reprisals. He was frankly horrified at the prospect of the chaos and bloodshed which would follow but he believed that if there were no intervention and unless the Jews received a strong and constant flow of reinforcements the Arabs would win in the course of six months or so. He had seen Haj Amin who he found was grossly underestimating the strength and capabilities of the Hagana. In fact he found the Palestine Arabs in a deplorable state of disunity and without concrete plans. He had taxed Haj Amin with having been privy to the murder of Samir Taha, and had told him that similar incidents between 1937 and 1939 had blackened the reputation of the Arabs. Haj Amin had denied any cognisance of the murder but had admitted it might have been Arabs who committed it. I asked him if the Arabs could not make some contact with the Jews, even unofficially. He replied that it was quite useless so long as the Jews stuck to their claim for a Jewish State. He had himself in London had a talk with Mr. Eban of the Jewish Agency and another Jew, whose name he forgot, but they would not abandon their claim to a State. He told them that if they would only come into a Palestinian State in course of time, as bitterness died down, they might achieve some form of autonomy - even possibly a state in a federation. The gap between the two sides at present was too great and he thought nothing could be gained by talks.

5. GREATER SYRIA. This he maintained was not a burning question now. It had been turned down by all the Arab States and every fresh declaration by Abdullah only did him harm. I pointed out to him that polemics indulged in by the heads of States only did harm. If even one side would refrain from them the question might sink out of sight. He said that if he got an opening he would do what he could to persuade the parties concerned to stop the controversy.

6. ARAB LEAGUE MEETING. The meeting at Beirut would, he said, consider the report of the political meeting and would consider possible action in the future, but would not, he thought, take any definite steps but would adjourn till after the 'Id on the 24th when they might know more of what was likely to happen at U.N.O.

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12, Edwardes Square, W. 8.

SECRET

16th October, 1947.

My dear Foreign Secretary,

I sat at dinner the other night next to Musa Bey Alami, who runs the Arab Information Offices, and may be presumed to know the views of the Arab League. After some commonplace conversation, such as that the Arabs would fight to resist the majority plan, he said "If partition comes about, it will have to be on certain conditions". I pricked up my ears, as this was the first time I had heard an Arab envisage the possibility of partition. I said to him that this seemed to me important, as I had not previously found Arabs willing even to discuss the possibility of partition as a solution. He did not dissent, but went on to discuss the conditions he had in mind, which included:

- (a) no possibility of the Jews using the Jewish State as a means of unlimited immigration;
- (b) an exchange of population on the basis of one Jew for one Arab, so that as far as possible there would be no Jews in the Arab State and no Arabs in the Jewish State;
- (c) the necessary exchange of land to be such that it would not give the Jews an excuse for further immigration.

This dinner took place the night the Russian views, following the American, became known, and

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.

Musa/

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FO 371 / 81836

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Dear Sir,

London

Musa Bey may have been influenced by their  
decision in favour of partition. But it was  
clearly more than a personal view, and I feel  
it proper to let you know the substance  
of our talk.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) IVOR THOMAS.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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12, Edwardes Square, W. 8.

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The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.

Musa/

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Musa Bey may have been influenced by their decision in favour of partition. But it was clearly more than a personal view, and I feel it proper to let you know the substance of our talk.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) IVOR THOMAS.

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Reference: FO 371 / 81836

E9696/49/31

B.A.B.B.

I ROUT FILE  
1000 OC 17/10  
18<sup>th</sup> October, 1947. 10

DRAFT

Mr. Beeley,  
New York.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Dear Harold

I enclose rather belatedly copies of two communications from Clayton about the views of the Mufti. These expressions of his <sup>the Mufti's</sup> opinion were, as you will see, obtained before <sup>he</sup> the ~~Mufti~~ went to Beirut. I also enclose a copy of a letter from Clayton to Wright, about a talk with Azzam.

In addition, I enclose a copy of a letter from Ivor Thomas to the Secretary of State about a talk with Musa el Alami. We are of course intensely interested in any sign of Arabs being ready to consider partition in some modified form. Is any significance from this point of view to be attached to Zafrullah's remarks in the Committee the other day? As you will have seen from our telegrams, we definitely do not want to associate ourselves at present with any compromise proposal, but the more we can get Arabs or Jews to talk of modifications, the better.

<sup>Have just seen the telegraphed</sup>  
~~I am writing before seeing a telegraphic~~  
text of the Colonial Secretary's latest speech. Judging from the "Times" version, ~~we~~ are not quite happy about two points in it, (This is at present a departmental view; we have not had the Secretary of State's opinion). One point is where he said: "Without suitable <sup>to negotiate</sup> authorities to which ~~to~~ transfer responsibility, <sup>to</sup>  
the/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Copies of 2 communications from Brig. Clayton about the Mufti. E97728 letter  
of Oct 2

Copy of letter from Brig. Clayton to Mr. Wright. 5/10/47

Copy of letter from Mr. Ivor Thomas. <sup>copy 1</sup>

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"the preservation of institutions . . . would become  
<sup>problems of</sup> a major difficulty". The second point is where  
he said that he hoped that when a policy was  
worked out which represented the consensus of  
international opinion, both parties would  
respect it.

We feel that the first of these passages  
might suggest to those who wished to understand  
it this way, e.g. especially the Americans,  
that we would not in fact, when the time came,  
face the prospect of leaving a vacuum. It is,  
however, an inescapable conclusion of our policy  
that we should in certain circumstances be ready  
to do this, and our willingness to do it is one  
of our strongest cards in forcing both Arabs and  
Jews and other Governments to take a realistic  
view of the situation and therefore to make  
every effort <sup>both</sup> to reach a more or less acceptable  
compromise <sup>and</sup> ~~on the one hand and, on the other hand,~~  
not to vote for a settlement without at the same  
time voting for adequate means of implementing  
it. The second passage suggests that we may  
in certain circumstances be asking Jews and Arabs  
to respect a settlement of which we ourselves  
disapprove to the point of not participating in  
implementing it. This is no doubt fundamentally  
a good democratic attitude of bowing to the will  
of the majority, but we feel that it may be rather  
difficult to put across in the Middle East without  
incurring the charge of hypocrisy. These are,  
however, comparatively minor points in a statement  
which on the whole ~~should~~ have had a ~~notably~~ good  
effect. Please let me know in return what you

have/

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have to criticise in our telegrams, or  
whether you would like to hear more from us  
than we have been sending hitherto.

*Yours ever*  
*GAB*

*17. X*

*(Sgd.) Bernard Barrow.*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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OUT FILE

13

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(E 9696/49/31)

18th October, 1947.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Dear Harold,

I enclose rather belatedly copies of two communications from Clayton about the views of the Mufti. These expressions of the Mufti's opinion were, as you will see, obtained before he went to Beirut. I also enclose a copy of a letter from Clayton to Wright, about a talk with Azzam.

In addition, I enclose a copy of a letter from Ivor Thomas to the Secretary of State about a talk with Musa el Alami. We are of course intensely interested in any sign of Arabs being ready to consider partition in some modified form. Is any significance from this point of view to be attached to Zafrullah's remarks in the Committee the other day? As you will have seen from our telegrams, we definitely do not want to associate ourselves at present with any compromise proposal, but the more we can get Arabs or Jews to talk of modifications, the better.

I have just seen the telegraphed text of the Colonial Secretary's latest speech. We are not quite happy about two points in it. (This is at present a departmental view; we have not had the Secretary of State's opinion). One point is where he said: "Without suitable authorities to negotiate and transfer responsibility to the preservation of institutions... would become problems of major difficulty". The second point is where he said that he hoped that when a policy was worked out which represented the consensus of international opinion, both parties would respect it.

We feel that the first of these passages might suggest to those who wished to understand it this way, e.g. especially the Americans, that we would not in fact, when the time came, face the prospect of leaving a vacuum. It is, however, an inescapable conclusion of our policy that we should in certain circumstances be ready to do this, and our willingness to do it is one of our strongest cards in forcing both Arabs and Jews and other Governments to take a realistic view of the situation and therefore to make every effort both to reach a more or less acceptable compromise and not to vote for a settlement without at the same time voting for adequate means of implementing it. The second passage suggests that we may in certain circumstances be asking Jews and Arabs to respect a settlement of which we ourselves disapprove to the point of not participating in implementing it. This is no doubt fundamentally a good democratic attitude of bowing to the will of the majority, but we feel that it may be rather difficult to put across in the Middle East without incurring the charge of hypocrisy. These are, however, comparatively minor points in a statement which on the whole should have had a good effect. Please let me know in return what you have to criticise in our telegrams, or whether you would like to hear more from us than we have been sending hitherto.

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) Bernard Burrows.

H. Beeley, Esq.,  
New York.

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FO 371 / 51836

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1947

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E 9697

17 OCT

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9697/49/31

FROM

Brigades Clayton

No.

Dated

31/23/11.9.

Received in Registry

2 Oct 17 -

Ex Mafti

Report an interview between an entirely trustworthy source and the Mafti who stated that all he asked of the MG now was that we should remain neutral and not give support to the Jews.

Last Paper

9696

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Now frame me E 9696

2-PP

W.S. Jones Oct. 27

BASS

28.8

(Action completed)

J.C.W. 4/11

(Index)

30/1/48

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9713

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DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference: FO 371 / 61836



31/23/11. G.

SECRET.

*By Mr Bernard*

An entirely trustworthy source yesterday had a long interview with the Mufti.

2. The latter began by asking after me, sending his compliments and saying that he very much wanted to see me. Source pointed out that it was not possible for me to see him and the Mufti replied that he realised this and did not want to embarrass me. He then continued his remarks with the obvious intention that they should be transmitted to me.

3. He maintained that despite all that had passed he and his followers in Palestine were not anti-British though they were unalterably opposed to the policy which had been pursued there for the last 30 years. All he asked of us now was that we should remain neutral and not give support to the Jews. (This remark seemed to refer chiefly to our attitude at U.N.O., and to our general political attitude in the question.

4. If the Arabs established a Palestine State he, for his part, would be in favour of granting to the Jews now in Palestine all rights that aliens receive in Great Britain or U.S.A. That is, any who were already Palestine citizens would be accepted as full citizens of the new State. Those still in possession of foreign passports would be treated as they are in other countries - each case on its merits.

5. He maintained that ever since the war and despite all that has been happening in Palestine the treatment of Jews in Arab countries compares very favourably with that accorded to Jews and other minorities in many countries of the world who are members of the United Nations Organisation.

6. The Arabs have no quarrel with the peaceful Jewish inhabitants of Palestine to whom nothing would happen and want to avoid any clash with the British. They would, however, tackle the militant Jewish bodies and are convinced that, once British support was withdrawn from the Zionists, these bodies would not present a very serious threat.

7. Great Britain in the Middle East had come out of the war weakened economically and militarily but strong in prestige but even in Syria and the Lebanon, which are more pro-British than any other Arab country feeling would turn against us if

we continued /

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W. 1.

*IC please. enter*  
BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,  
10, SHARIA TOLUMBAT, 15  
CAIRO.  
2nd October, 1947.

E 9097  
17 OCT

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BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,  
10, SHARIA TOLUMBAT, 16  
CAIRO.

-2-

we continued to support the Zionist case.

8. This attitude of the Mufti, if genuine, represents a considerable advance from his former one. Source remarked that he seemed very confident and sure of himself and obviously thinks that the Arab position is much stronger than it has been.

9. As regards the Mufti's messages to me, I receive these from many sources and invariably make the same reply to my informant that it is out of the question for me to see him. It would, however, evidently be quite easy to do so, should it ever be deemed advisable, without putting myself in the position of making the first move. It would merely be a question of waiting for the next advance from him.

10. I am sending copies of this report to the Embassy in Cairo and to the Chief Secretary in Jerusalem.

*Yours sincerely  
F. H. H. H. H.*


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E 9713

1947

PALESTINE

18 OCT

Registry Number

E9713/47/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Mr Evans

Recruit

760

16 Oct

18 -

Ex - 114/15

Reps 40 (128 (E9381/49/31) yet in  
London P.M. on invited. Red by said  
to be a full agreement and would make  
it in business as not the ex-114/15  
activities did not make added difficulties  
for Police Govt.

Last Paper.

9697

(Minutes.)

Mr Evans has replied separately  
to the 3rd para. of our tel. no  
628.

References.

(Print.)

N.S. Smith  
Oct. 20

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheran. C.G.  
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Admly  
A. 14.

Oct 22  
(on E9711/951/31)

R. J. G. G. G.  
2/10

W.B.S.

21. X

(Action completed.)

9/26/25/10

(Index.)

28/1/48

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18

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans  
No. 760

D. 8.0 a.m. 17th October 1947  
R.11.19 a.m. 17th October 1947

16th October 1947.  
Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York  
Cairo  
Jerusalem  
B.M.E.O. Cairo

Bagdad \* )  
Jedda ) Saving.  
Amman )  
Damascus )

E 9713  
18 OCT

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 628; Ex-Mufti.

I spoke to Lebanese Prime Minister as instructed.

2. Riad Bey said he was in full agreement and would make it his business to see that the ex-Mufti's activities did not create added difficulties for Palestine Government.

3. Riad Bey said he had received the ex-Mufti with every honour and that in this way he had succeeded in cutting the ground from under the feet of the ex-Mufti's extremist followers. The ex-Mufti had every reason to be pleased with his reception. Nevertheless it was noteworthy that he had not attended meetings of the Arab League nor any public functions. Furthermore he was under constant supervision and his movements had been, and would continue to be, discreet. Riad Bey added that he had told Haj Amin that he should take no action without first consulting him.

4. Speaking of the project for a provisional Arab Government of Palestine which had been discussed by the Arab League Council, Riad Bey said that he had opposed its immediate establishment and that he had told the ex-Mufti that when the time came for the Arab League to set up some form of provisional Government (please see paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 753) he, the ex-Mufti would not (repeat not)

/be.....

18 OCT  
MAY 1947

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2.

*Spans attached*

be a member of it.

5. I formed the impression that the Lebanese Prime Minister was much relieved that heavier demands (which he would have been unable to accept - please see my telegram No. 735) had not been made on him in connexion with the ex-Mufti's activities. He said he would inform the President, but no one else, of our conversation.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 59.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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E

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E 9767

1947

PALESTINE  
PALESTINE

20 OCT

Registry Number } E9767/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. Mr Evans

Dated Beirut

Received in Registry } 762  
17 Oct

18 -

Ex - Mupli.

French translation of two passages from report published by the newspaper at Beirut of interview given by Ex-Mupli. on withdrawal of British from Palestine is necessary.

2) Brannard local Govt of Palestine.

Last Paper.

9713

(Minutes.)

References.

First mention of Jihad B.S. Dennis

24/10/47 Oct. 20

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Wetheran 8.0.

M.I. 3.9

M.O.H.

Admiral

A.M.

Oct 22

(on E9711/951/31)

(Action completed.)

GP/16 28/10

(Index.)

RSA 30/11/48

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E 3767

En Clair

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20 OCT

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans.  
No. 762.

D. 12.55 p.m. 17th October, 1947.

17th October, 1947 R. 2.58 p.m. 17th October, 1947.

Repeated Saving to Amman, British Middle East Office Cairo,  
Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem,  
United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Ex-Mufti.

Following is translation of two passages  
from report published by the newspaper Al Hayat  
of interview given by ex-Mufti.

[Begins]

Paragraph 1. Colonial Secretary's statement.  
The withdrawal of the British from Palestine is  
necessary. We have received this statement with  
satisfaction and are now awaiting fulfilment of  
its contents in order to realise our full rights.

2. Provisional Arab Government of Palestine.  
This is the time for the Jihad and we are not  
concerned with formalities, appearances or names.  
We believe that it is better and more convenient  
both in the interests of Palestine and our cause  
to remain as a committee, as we are at present,  
until we get through the present very difficult  
stage. Later on whatever is more convenient  
will be done.

[Ends].

Full text follows by bag.

333

20 OCT 1947  
XXVII

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Reference: FO 371 / 51836

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18

E

E 9851

1947

PALESTINE

22

22

Registry Number

E 9851/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir A. Kirkbride

No.

Amman

Dated

Received in Registry

313

21 Oct

22

Ex. Ubufti.

Ubufti has asked for permission to reside at Amman, and was told that his presence would not be welcomed.

Last Paper.

9767

(Minutes.)

References.

~~FOIA~~ 25/10

Fable

(CABLE)

22/10

H.S. Davis  
Oct. 22

PP  
22/7

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wharfedale P.O.  
M. 1.3.9.

M.O.H.

Admty  
a/nr.

✓ Oct-23

(Action completed.)

GC 28/10

(Index.)

28/10

Next Paper.

E 9980

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

23  
E

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride D. 11.50 a.m. 21st Oct 1947  
No. 515 R. 12.54 p.m. 21st Oct 1947

1947  
2851  
OCT

21st October 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Bagdad

Cairo

Jedda

British Middle East Office Cairo

Beirut (Please pass to Damascus as my saving telegram No. 26)

Jerusalem Saving

Haj Amin El Hussein asked for permission to reside at Amman and was told that his presence would not be welcomed.

Foreign Office please pass to the United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 11, 60, 98, 59, 48 respectively.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and B.M.E.O.]

ccc



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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

59

1947

E

E 9980

27 OCT

PALESTINE

24

Registry Number *E9980/49/31*  
 FROM *Legation Beirut*  
 No. *Beirut*  
 Dated *14/5*  
 Received in Registry *20 Oct 24*

*Ex-Abdullahi*  
 After Beirut tel 762 (E9767/49/31)  
 now transmit full translation of a report  
 appearing in "al Hayat" of an interview  
 given by the Ex-Abdullahi.

Last Paper

*9851*

(Minutes.)

References

*N. Dept. <sup>Verbal</sup> 30/x*

*copy/CS -*

*Jb Oct. 27*

(Print)

(How disposed of)

*8, BV.  
Oct 29*

(Action completed)

*L. H. 31/10*

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
*20/9/48*

Next Paper

E 10000

89538

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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145 (72/52/47).

E  
25

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Beirut  
presents his compliments to Principal Secretary of State  
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned for  
documents. Foreign Affairs

British Legation..... **E 9980**  
Beirut.....

27 OCT

Reference to previous correspondence:

Beirut telegram No. 762 of 17.10.47. **E 976749**

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of report from "Al Hayat" of interview given by ex-Mufti of Jerusalem on 15.10.47.	



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Reference:-

**FO 371 / 61836**

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The following is a full translation of a report appearing in "Al Hayat" of an interview given by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and from which extracts were given in Beirut telegram No. 762 of October 17th.

The "Hayat's" representative in Aley reports:-

Yesterday I was fortunate in interviewing His Excellency Haj' Amin Al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and Head of the Arab Higher Committee, in his special apartment at Hotel Tanios, Aley. I asked him to comment for "Al-Hayat" on the grave questions of the hour and requested him to elucidate certain aspects of these questions.

Of the statement of the British Government that they were determined to withdraw their troops and administration from Palestine, His Eminence said:-

"The withdrawal of the British from Palestine is necessary. We have received this statement with satisfaction, and are now awaiting its execution in order to realise our full rights."

I asked His Excellency for his opinion of the Russian statement in favour of the partitioning of Palestine, and he replied:-

"Does this require a question and answer? The Great Powers do evil to us and to themselves. It is enough to say this much about their attitude towards the just and righteous question of Palestine."

What is your opinion on the question of setting up a Government for Palestine?

"This is the time for the Jihad, and we are not concerned with formalities, appearances or names. We believe that it is better and more expedient both in the interest of Palestine and our cause to remain as a Committee as we are at present until we get through this present very difficult stage. Later on whatever is more expedient will be done."

Are you satisfied with the decisions of the Arab League Council?

"Yes, we are satisfied with these decisions, and the Arab Higher Committee are continuing their meetings incessantly to study and scrutinize them. However, matters concerning the command of the Jihad and military activities are still under the consideration of a technical committee which has been set up especially for this purpose, and which includes military and civilian leaders."

It is said that the Command will be given to Commander Taha Al-Hashemy. What is your opinion?

"This statement is a mere rumour and premature, though Taha Al-Hashemy is one of the best military men in the Arab countries."

What is your advice to the Arabs?

"My advice to the Arabs is to unify their ranks, but I do not think they are in need of advice because they are not ignorant of the fact that the cause of Palestine is the cause of them all, and that its salvation from the claws of the greedy amounts to the salvation of

/themselves ...

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Reference: FO 371 / 81836

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themselves, their countries and their heritage. Let every Arab look to to-morrow with faith, for we shall continue the Jihad to the end, and till Palestine is saved."

Have you decided to remain in Lebanon as it has been rumoured?

"We have not yet taken a final decision on the choice of a place of residence. This is subject to the development of the general situation."

I have noticed that His Eminence wisely maintains secrecy in matters concerning the Jihad. He has announced that the present circumstances do not permit of indulgence in making declarations and elucidations and that this hour requires wisdom and foresight.

Delegations of prominent men, leaders and youths continue to visit him at all hours of the day. They enquire for his health, solicit his blessing and announce their loyalty to him and their readiness to place all their belongings at his disposal in the cause of Palestine.

In the meantime the Arab Higher Committee under his presidency pursue their task with tireless vigour, and the Committee members carry on their work in different countries and areas. While the majority of them are continuing their discussions and study in Aley, others are representing the Committee at the Council of the Arab League. Still others are active in Damascus, and another group are representing Palestine at U.N.O. under the leadership of Jamal Al-Husseini.

"Al-Hayat" dated 16th October, 1947.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 91836

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60

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E 10000

1947

PALESTINE

27 OCT

28

Registry Number } E 10000/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. *III Canal Beirut*

Dated *778*  
Received in Registry } *26 Oct 27 -*

*Ex-emptis*

*Refer to tel 661. Realise Parliamentary Question and answer are inevitable but best sentence will not make the task of the Lebanese Govt any easier. No publicity has been given to representation referred to in the last sentence, which according to Lebanese PM are only known to himself, the President, and the Mupht.*

Last Paper.

*9980*

(Minutes.)

*JB Oct. 27*

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*8 Mathison CO  
Admty  
A/M.  
M. 1.39.  
M.O. 4  
(in 9995/25/31) Oct 29.  
Tel. Cairo 1948  
Beirut 661  
Oct 25.*

*8, M 139 31 Oct.*

(Action completed.)

*21/10*

(Index.)

*30/1/48*

Next Paper.

E 10077

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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8, M.I. 3a,  
W.U.  
✓ Nov 5  
ref.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.2

E  
29

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans D.12.36 p.m. 26th October, 1947.  
No.778 R.2 . 6 p.m. 26th October, 1947.  
26th October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

NR

E 10000

Following for Eastern Department.

Your telegram No.661: Ex - Mufti **27 OCT**

Parliamentary Question.

I realise this Parliamentary Question and answer are inevitable but last sentence will not make the task of the Lebanese Government any easier. No publicity has been given here to representations referred to in this last sentence which, according to Lebanese Prime Minister, are only known to himself, the President and the ex-Mufti. I suggest therefore that the less publicity given in Arab countries the better.

2. At the beginning of the last sentence of the answer I would suggest "later" be substituted for "also".

B B B

OCT 1947  
27

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Reference:-

**FO 371 / 51836**

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

I.  
P.  
G.

OUT FILE

F. O.,

30

25 October 1947.

Immediate Despatched 2.45 P.M.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador, Cairo. 1978  
H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, Beirut. Telegram. 661

No. ....  
(Date) Oct 25<sup>th</sup>

Repeat to :—

~~Ex Clair.~~  
~~Codex~~  
Cypher.

Distribution :—

No. 2 Departmental

Copies to :—  
M/3a

Foll from Eastern Dept

Parliamentary Questions have been put down for 27th October on the subject of the political activities of the Mufti and for your information draft reply (which is still subject to final approval) has been submitted on the following lines:—

"When the Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Egypt in 1946, H.M. Representative enquired, in the course of his representations, whether the Egyptian Government would prevent him from leaving the country but the Egyptian Government replied that they could not undertake to do this. In the circumstances no useful purpose would be served by further representations to the Egyptian Government on this point and none have been made.

"When the Mufti arrived in Beirut from Egypt on 8th October, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires informed the Lebanese Government that in view of the repeated representations made on this subject, the Mufti's arrival would undoubtedly make a most unfavourable impression on H.M.G. He also informed the Lebanese Government on instructions that H.M.G. counted on them to restrain the Mufti from taking any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine and the Lebanese Government have agreed to do so."

JAB 25.10

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... Fo .....

Class ..... 371 .....

Piece ..... 61836 .....

Following document(s) retained in the  
Department of origin under Section 3 (4)  
of the Public Records Act, 1958

E 100 77/49/31  
E 10097

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61836

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63

1947

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E 10098

32

PALESTINE

30 OCT

Registry Number

E10098/49/31

FROM

PQ

No.

M. Fanner

Dated

27 Oct

Received in Registry

30

Ex M/Lt.

to Fanner about Sept whether any assurances have been given by Helwan that the M/Lt will be forbidden to take part in any political activity during the period of his stay there.  
M. Mayhew replied.

Last Paper

10097

References

M/Lt

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8, Cairo no. 785  
Beirut no. 225  
ref  
Nov - 14

(Action completed)

JEM 24/11

(Index)

[Signature] 20/11/48

Next Paper

E 10184

(Minutes.)

[Signature]  
(T.E. CABRE)  
31/10

Egyptian Dept. CA. 4/11

Copy Cairo & Beirut  
repe.

JB at. 31

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

EASTERN

E 10098

E 33

Parliamentary Question

\* 14. Mr. Janner, to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether any assurances have been given by the Government of the Lebanon that the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem will be forbidden to take part in any political activities during the period of his stay on Lebanese soil, similar to those given in respect of his stay in Egypt by the Egyptian Government. [Monday 27th October.]

tab

Leicester W

ANSWERED 27 OCT 1947  
REPLY ATTACHED.

It is suggested that we should take this question and No. 29 (Mr. George Porter) together. They both concern the Mufti's recent move from Cairo to Beirut.

When the Mufti arrived in Egypt in 1946 we requested the Egyptian Government to prevent him from indulging in political activities. ~~H.M.G.~~ also suggested that the Mufti ~~might~~ be prevented from leaving Egypt. The Egyptian Government were unwilling to guarantee that they could prevent his escape and they did not agree to prevent him from having normal contacts with political friends.


The Mufti recently arrived in Beirut, his arrival coinciding with a meeting of the Arab League. Mr. Evans represented to the Lebanese Government that his arrival would be very unwelcome to H.M.G. We approved his language and asked him to add that H.M.G. counted upon the Lebanese Government to restrain him from any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine. The Lebanese Government have agreed to this.

It was decided not to make representations to the Egyptian Government about the Mufti's departure since they had never said they would stop him leaving.

Egyptian Dept. J. G. S. Beith  
Co. Concurs, subject to describing Haj Amin as the Mufti.

(J. G. S. Beith)  
24th October, 1947.

*J. G. S. Beith*  
V 24/10



H91-3 Flag A

My minute in E9627/49/31 contains most of the back history.

It would be desirable to telegraph to

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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EASTERN

35

Parliamentary Question

\* 29. Mr. George Porter.—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether any representations have been made to the Egyptian Government regarding the departure of the Ex-Mufti of Jerusalem from that country to Beirut, to take part in the political activities of the Arab League. [Monday 27th October.]

Lab

Leeds Central

See No. 14 (Mr Langer)

and minute

JB Oct. 24

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**





## PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

enter  
36

### MUFTI OF JERUSALEM

20. **Mr. Janner** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any assurances have been given by the Government of the Lebanon that the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem will be forbidden to take part in any political activities during the period of his stay on Lebanese soil, similar to those given in respect of his stay in Egypt by the Egyptian Government.

28. **Mr. George Porter** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any representations have been made to the Egyptian Government regarding the departure of the Ex-Mufti of Jerusalem from that country to Beirut, to take part in the political activities of the Arab League.

**Mr. Mayhew:** When the Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Egypt in 1946, His Majesty's Representative inquired, in the course of his representations, whether the Egyptian Government would prevent him from leaving the country, but the Egyptian Government replied that they could not undertake to do this. In the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by further representations to the Egyptian Government on this point, and none have been made. When the Mufti arrived in Beirut from Egypt on 8th October, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Lebanese Government that in view of the repeated representations made on this subject, the Mufti's arrival would undoubtedly make a most unfavourable impression on His Majesty's Government. He later informed the Lebanese Government, on

instructions, that His Majesty's Government counted on them to restrain the Mufti from taking any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine.

**Mr. Janner:** Is my hon. Friend going to leave it at that? In view of the abused position in Egypt, will he not take further steps with the Lebanon as regards this dangerous man?

**Mr. Mayhew:** We have made our views clear to the Lebanese Government, and they have agreed to do what we have asked—to restrain the Mufti from taking embarrassing action against us.

**Mr. Porter:** Is my hon. Friend not in agreement that the action taken up with the Egyptian Government in regard to this individual was very belated? Is he aware that I put down a Question when he was on French soil and he could then have been taken into custody and treated as an ordinary enemy alien?

**Mr. Mayhew:** I cannot remember that, but I think we took quite prompt action with the Egyptian Government, although we were unable to get the guarantee that they would undertake not to allow him to leave Egypt.

**Mr. Porter:** Is my hon. Friend aware that when I asked my previous Question regarding this man, I was told that he could not be traced, although I stated that my information was that he was on French soil?

**Mr. Mayhew:** That is another question.

27 OCT 1947

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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## PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

E

28. **Mr. George Porter** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any representations have been made to the Egyptian Government regarding the departure of the Ex-Mufti of Jerusalem from that country to Beirut, to take part in the political activities of the Arab League.

**Mr. Mayhew:** When the Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Egypt in 1946, His Majesty's Representative inquired, in the course of his representations, whether the Egyptian Government would prevent him from leaving the country, but the Egyptian Government replied that they could not undertake to do this. In the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by further representations to the Egyptian Government on this point, and none have been made. When the Mufti arrived in Beirut from Egypt on 8th October, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Lebanese Government that in view of the repeated representations made on this subject, the Mufti's arrival would undoubtedly make a most unfavourable impression on His Majesty's Government. He later informed the Lebanese Government, on instructions, that His Majesty's Government counted on them to restrain the Mufti from taking any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine.

**Mr. Janner:** Is my hon. Friend going to leave it at that? In view of the abused position in Egypt, will he not take further steps with the Lebanon as regards this dangerous man?

**Mr. Mayhew:** We have made our views clear to the Lebanese Government, and they have agreed to do what we have asked—to restrain the Mufti from taking embarrassing action against us.

**Mr. Porter:** Is my hon. Friend not in agreement that the action taken up with the Egyptian Government in regard to this individual was very belated? Is he aware that I put down a Question when he was on French soil and he could then have been taken into custody and treated as an ordinary enemy alien?

**Mr. Mayhew:** I cannot remember that, but I think we took quite prompt action with the Egyptian Government, although we were unable to get the guarantee that they would undertake not to allow him to leave Egypt.

**Mr. Porter:** Is my hon. Friend aware that when I asked my previous Question regarding this man, I was told that he could not be traced, although I stated that my information was that he was on French soil? 37

**Mr. Mayhew:** That is another question.

27 OCT 1947

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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20

38

20 + 28

DRAFT REPLY TO

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

No. 14 by Mr. Janner

and No. 29 by Mr. George

Porter, both of Monday 27th

October.

Colonial Office concur

I will, with permission, answer this question and No. <sup>28</sup> 29 together.

When the Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Egypt in 1946, H.M. Representative enquired, in the course of his representations, whether the Egyptian Government would prevent him from leaving the country but the Egyptian Government replied that they could not undertake to do this. In the circumstances no useful purpose would be served by further representations to the Egyptian Government on this point and none have been made.

When the Mufti arrived in Beirut from Egypt on 8th October, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires informed the Lebanese Government that in view of the repeated representations made on this subject the Mufti's arrival would undoubtedly make a most unfavourable impression on H.M.G. He <sup>later</sup> also informed the Lebanese Government on instructions that H.M.G. counted on them to restrain the Mufti from taking any action which would cause added difficulty for the British Administration in Palestine. ~~The Lebanese Government have agreed to do so.~~

CPM

26/x

Supp.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

39

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans D.12.36 p.m. 26th October, 1947.  
No.778 R.2 . 6 p.m. 26th October, 1947.  
26th October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Following for Eastern Department.

Your telegram No.661: Ex - Mufti.

Parliamentary Question.

I realise this Parliamentary Question and answer are inevitable but last sentence will not make the task of the Lebanese Government any easier. No publicity has been given here to representations referred to in this last sentence which, according to Lebanese Prime Minister, are only known to himself, the President and the ex-Mufti. I suggest therefore that the less publicity given in Arab countries the better.

2. At the beginning of the last sentence of the answer I would suggest "later" be substituted for "also".

B B B

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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64

E

E 10184 40

1947

PALESTINE

OCT

Registry Number } E10184/49/31  
 TELEGRAM FROM  
 No. M' Evans  
 Dated Beirut  
 Received in Registry } 783  
 29 Oct  
 31

*Further activities of the M.P.L.*  
 Refers (11/25/47) (E10090/46/31) (or also from Beirut) to appreciation of the M.P.L. attitude and of the possibility of incursions by guerrilla bands, given a para 3 of ref appears to be somewhat over optimistic, gives further news.

Last Paper.  
 10098

(Minutes.)

References.

Account has been taken of this telegram in a draft reply to the telegram from the U.K. Delegation at New York reporting the American intention to launch their new partition scheme in the Palestine Committee. Paragraph 2 of this telegram shows that, so long as we remain in Palestine, things are likely to be made very difficult for us by the adoption of the measures proposed by the United States.

(Print.)

Apart from this point, Mr. Evans makes in paragraph 4 a suggestion almost similar to that made by Brigadier Clayton in paragraph 8 of his Note in E.10152. Both these British representatives, speaking from Arab countries, consider that we should be justified and indeed well advised to take a suitable opportunity of warning the Arab Governments once more that they should be careful to avoid any action prejudicial to our authority in Palestine as long as we are there. We have at present a store of good-will and influence with the Arab countries which should make our representations effective.

(How disposed of.)

*S. Beathasan & Co.  
 M.I.39.  
 M.I.4  
 Admty  
 G.M.  
 ✓ Nov 4*

I suggest that the present is not a suitable moment for a further warning to the Arabs. We should I think watch for an opportunity, which will possibly occur when we make some further announcement clearly indicating the short time we propose to stay in Palestine, e.g. an announcement of the date for the beginning of the withdrawal.

*J.G.S. Beith*

J.G.S. Beith.  
 1st November, 1947.

(Action completed.)  
*J.C. Morris*  
 (Initials)  
*J.G.S. Beith*  
 30/11/47

Next Paper.

*I agree that we should bear this in mind, but that the present is not the moment for a further warning.*

*R. G. ...  
 3/11/47*

10330

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.  
*B.V. Nox 15-12*

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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41°

The suggestion is incorporated in  
the paper about to be taken by the  
Defence Ctee.

JAS

3.21

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

E 42

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans,

D. 4.50 p.m. 29th October, 1947.

No. 783

29th October, 1947.

R. 7.03 p.m. 29th October, 1947.

Repeated to New York (UKDEL)

- Jerusalem,
- Cairo,
- B.M.E.O. Cairo,
- Bagdad, )
- Amman, )
- Damascus, )
- Jedda, )

SAVING

10184

31 OCT

SECRET

Your telegram No. 2547 to Jerusalem; Palestine.

As seen from here the appreciation of the ex-Mufti's attitude and of the possibility of incursions by guerilla bands given in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference appears to be somewhat over optimistic.

2. It is true that at recent meeting of Arab League Council the Arab States decided not to resort to action with regular forces as long as British troops remained in Palestine and there is every likelihood that this decision will hold good even if the United Nations reached a decision unfavourable to the Arabs. Unfortunately the situation as regards action by irregulars is not so clear. The Lebanese Government have agreed to restrain the ex-Mufti from any action which might render more difficult the task of the Government of Palestine. It also appears to have been decided by the Arab League Council that [gp. undec.? irregulars] whether Palestinian or belonging to the Arab States should remain inactive for the time being i.e. at least until United Nations decision is known. Ex-mufti acquiesced in this decision but I suspect that he did not after much heart searching (please see paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 746). There is no evidence, however, that any decision has been reached regarding action by irregulars after United Nations' decision and in the event of it being unfavourable to the Arabs. In fact the Lebanese Prime Minister recently told me that no decision had been taken on this point. He said the situation would have to be considered at the time and that he could not say definitely what would be done, though he added that he personally saw advantage in the Arabs taking no action even in such an even equality as long as British forces remained in Palestine.

Loss reassuring...

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Reference: FO 371 / 51836

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reassuring (as it possibly indicates that Riad Bey may be to some extent inclining to the views of the ex-Mufti) was Riad Bey's statement that he had changed his opinion regarding ability of Palestine Arabs to stand up to the Jews; he now thought they could do so successfully. As regards Azzam Pasha, he is, according to United States Minister, of the opinion that a rising of Palestine Arabs would be unavoidable if the Jews, following a decision by United Nations declared a Jewish State in Palestine - compare paragraph 1 of my telegram No.746. Finally, it is more than probable that if such a decision is reached the ex-Mufti will be exposed to a great deal of pressure from his extremist followers and that he may himself be tempted to precipitate events in the hope of increasing his own prestige.

3. There is every reason to believe that before any action is taken following a United Nation's decision unfavourable to the Arabs the Arab League Council will be re-assembled. This probably constitutes some safeguard [gp.undec.] Arab leaders will probably be hard pressed to find a solution which, while stopping short of violence, will at the same time satisfy public opinion. As far as can be judged from here there may well be a clash between, on the one hand, Saleh Jabr (who appears to be opposed to action by irregular forces - please see my telegram No.769) and on the other, Arab leaders who might come under the influence of the ex-Mufti. Azzam Pasha and Riad Bey will probably try to steer a middle course. It would, therefore, be rash to assume that Saleh Jabr will be definitely able to maintain the advantage he gained at the recent meeting or that wise counsels will prevail; and if the extremists gained the day it is very doubtful whether we could count much on Lebanese ability to restrain the ex-Mufti.

4. I feel therefore that it may be well to point out to various Arab Governments ~~as and when~~ suitable opportunity occurs (and particularly if Arab League Council is recalled) that any action predudicial to authority in Palestine as long as we are there (even if the United Nation decision goes against them) will only damage the interests of the Arabs themselves and at the same time complicate our task. There is a widespread feeling at present that a clash with us must be avoided at almost any cost and this should be encouraged.

5. Since the above was drafted I have been informed by United States Legation here that according to information received from Washington there is now no (repeat no) chance of a solution on basis of U.N.S.C.O.P. major recommendations being approved. But even if partition is rejected there is a danger that the situation may develop on the lines indicated above; it might do so, for example, if the Jews attempt to set up a Jewish State or if there were widespread attacks on the Arabs.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York as my telegram No.41 and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.208  
[Repeated to UKDEL New York]

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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65

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E 10330

1947

PALESTINE

5 NOV

44

Registry Number

E10330/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

M. L. L. L.

Beirut

795

3 Nov

5 -

to Mufti.

Lebanese President has confirmed to a member of staff, press report that the Mufti proposes to spend the winter in Lebanon. He is certainly appeared displeased with this development but it is clear that he and his staff can only accept it as inevitable.

Last Paper.

10184

(Minutes.)

OW

References.

H. S. Bevis  
Nov. 6

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheson P.O.  
M.L.S.O.

M.O. 4

Adm. 1

A.M.

✓ Nov 7

RP  
7/x1

(Action completed.)

PP  
7/11/47

(Index)

PP  
7/11/47

Next Paper.

E 10374

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Evans. D. 9.07 a.m. 4th November, 1947.  
No. 795.  
3rd November, R. 10.20 a.m. 4th November, 1947.  
1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Savig Cairo, Bagdad,  
British Middle East Office Cairo,  
Damascus, Amman and Jedda.

Ex-Mufti.

The Lebanese President has confirmed to  
a member of my staff, a press report that the  
ex-Mufti proposes to spend the winter in  
Lebanon. His Excellency appeared displeased  
with this development but it is clear that  
he and his Government can only accept it as  
inevitable.

535

10330

5 NOV



45

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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10374

6 NOV

ROAT

PALESTINE

46

Registry Number

E10374/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Lt A. Kirkbride

Dated

Amman

Received in Registry

328

5 Nov

6

Activities of the Ex-Mufti

Refer Amman tel 319 (E10097/49/31) Agam appears to have convinced King Abdullah and Saudi that there has been no secret meeting at Damascus. On other hand Saudi admits that Agam is untrusting in his determination that the Mufti is not to be excluded from any future action taken by the Arab States about Palestine.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

10370

References.

M. J. Seins  
Nov. 6

There are the makings of trouble here

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 sub allusion. 80.

1 M.I. 32.

M04

Adm/

Am.

Nov. 7

On E10330/49/31

R. P. Arsan  
7/11

Nos, 1 hope, for us.

BARB

7-11

(Action completed.)

ESM/8/11

(In x.)

[Handwritten signature]

Next Paper.

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION NOV

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride D. 1.10 p.m. 5th November 1947  
No. 328 R. 2.20 p.m. 5th November 1947

5th November 1947  
Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Bagdad  
Beirut  
Cairo  
Damascus  
British Middle East Office Cairo  
Jerusalem  
Jedda

Saving

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 319.

Palestine.

Azzam appears to have convinced King Abdullah and Samir that there had been no secret meeting at Damascus.

On the other hand Samir admits that Azzam is unshaken in his determination that the Mufti is not to be excluded from any future action taken by the Arab States about Palestine.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 14.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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E 10491  
10 NOV 48

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10491/49/31  
FROM C.G.F. Dandak  
No. Damarus  
Dated 11/14/48  
Received in Registry } 30 Oct  
10 Nov

Ex Mufti  
Re view of fact that ex-Mufti visited Syria on Oct 25 see Damarus tel NY 2 (E10077/49/31) took early opportunity to express point of view, explained - 40. til 628 to Beirut to head of Syrian Mij for Foreign Affairs and to Damascus. Will take first opportunity to make same point with Jamel Mardam Bey.

Last Paper.

10274

(Minutes.)

copy CO. (Mr T. Smith)

Mr. C. Jones  
Nov. 10

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Trafford Litch.  
E.P.  
✓ 14 Nov.

R. J. Gannon  
✓ 10/11

BABBS  
10/11

(Action completed.)

J. E. M. 11/11

(Index)

[Handwritten initials and date]

Next Paper.

E 10611

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

SECRET.

10 191

10 NOV

British Legation,  
Damascus.

30th Oct., 1947.

116/47/47.

*Dear Burrows,*

In view of the fact that the ex-Mufti of Palestine visited Syria on October 25th, as reported in my telegram No. 472 of October 27th, I took an early opportunity to express our point of view, as explained in para. 2 of ~~my~~ telegram No. 628 to Beirut, to the Head of the Political Section of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and to Armenazi (Syrian Minister in London), who is at present in Damascus.

I will take the first opportunity to make the same point with Jamil Mardam Bey. I do not, however, intend to make a special effort to see the President on this subject, since, although he is now transacting some business, he is still a sick man and in partial retirement at Zebdani. If I see him in the normal course of events however, I will, of course, take the opportunity to mention the matter to him.

*Zours ever*

*C. A. F. Junder*

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,  
Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 81836**

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1947

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E 10611

13 NOV

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PALESTINE

Registry Number E10611/49/31  
 FROM Sir D. Kirkbride  
 No. Amman  
 Dated 5/852/46  
 Received by M. Burrows  
 in Registry 9 Nov  
 13 ~

Ex - Mufti.

During talks with ABDUL RAHMAN AZZAM the Ex Mufti's activities were mentioned. AZZAM said that while Sir (Mufti) had gained a great deal of experience since he fled from Palestine, he had learnt very little. His one idea was that as soon as Britain had withdrawn from Palestine the Arabs should fall upon the Jews and destroy them. Azzam feared that in this case Palestine would be thrown into a state of chaos.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

10491

References.

Para. 6 in working of note.

WA Dept.  
 Egyptian Dept. <sup>25/11</sup>

Mrs. Deird  
 Nov. 13  
 (BEITH)

L. St. Pagan  
 14/11

PARS

14.11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

G. E. M. 14/11

(Index.)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

E 10648

32003 F.O.P

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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REG. ADDRESS: PRODROME AMMAN  
REF. NO. (S/852/46).

**SECRET**

BRITISH LEGATION  
AMMAN

10611  
13 NOV

3rd November, 1947.

*Anter*  
51

Dear Burrows,

I had two talks to Abder Rahman Azzam during his recent stay at Amman, the first when he called at my residence and the second when I returned his call.

A great deal of the ground gone over by Azzam in these talks is, no doubt, familiar to all those who are concerned with Middle Eastern affairs but he made one or two remarks which interested me and I repeat them in case they may interest others also.

2. Speaking of Haj Amin el Husseini, Azzam said that, while the latter had gained a great deal of experience since he had fled from Palestine about ten years ago, he had learnt very little. Haj Amin's one idea, at present, was that, as soon as the British forces had withdrawn, the Arabs should, with one accord fall upon the Jews in Palestine and destroy them.

It was useless to point out the practical difficulty of destroying a well armed and organised community of 700,000 people, Haj Amin just brushed the matter aside and answered that the great thing was to get the British forces out so as to give the Arabs a clear field.

Azzam feared that, if the Mufti, was given an opportunity of putting his ideas into practice, Palestine would be thrown into a state of chaos as least, if not more, harmful to the Arabs as to the Jews. It was for that reason that Azzam had resisted the formation of an interim Arab Government of Palestine under the Mufti's control and had insisted that any Arab intervention in Palestine must be done by the Arab states acting in concert.

When I queried as to why if he was dangerous, the Arab League cherished the Mufti quite so much, Azzam said that he had captured the imagination of the Arab masses and the League could not, therefore, afford to drop him. He added that as the Jews had their extremists, Stern and I.Z.L., he supposed that the Arabs should have theirs also.

3. Speaking of Egypt, Azzam remarked, despairingly, that the Egyptian Ministers had manoeuvred themselves into a fix from which only Great Britain could deliver them and Great Britain, not without justification refused to do it. He felt that an act of great statesmanship by Great Britain might win over Egypt just as India and Pakistan had been won over. X

X  
(or something)

He did not respond to my observation that the present picture, which he painted as that of the Middle Eastern states yearning for Great Britain's friendship, could appear, when viewed from our angle, as an organised attempt to drive us out of the Middle East altogether.

4/...2

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,  
The Eastern Department,  
The Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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Reference:

**FO 371** / 51836

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
4. In the course of a treatise on the internal politics of Egypt, Assam said that he visualized in the "Akhwan el Muslimeen" the future socialist part of the Arab World. It was true that the party had been founded under the cloak of Islam but the principles of Islam were so democratic that it was relatively easy to switch over to socialism. He personally was using his influence to direct the Akhwan in that direction as he felt that they would be a better counter to communism than the right wing parties supported by the courts and the landowners.

5. He informed me that Jamil Mardam had accepted the invitation to visit Assam recently with other members of the Council of the Arab League without having first consulted the President.

When Shukri Kuwatli got to know of the visit he insisted that Jamil Mardam could not go.

6. Assam spoke bitterly of the support given to the Jewish claims by the United States of America and he bewailed the fact that there was little the Arab World could do in reply. He said that any economic reprisal would harm the Arabs more than the Americans.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jeddah, Jerusalem and the British Middle East Office.

*Yours sincerely*  


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 Reference: **FO 371 / 81836**

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14 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

53

Registry Number

E10648/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

W. Wans  
Beirut

820

12, Nov

14

Interview Ex-Mufti - Sir Feroz Khan Noon  
Refer Beirut tel 483 (E10184/49/31) Sir Feroz  
gave following indication of interview with the  
Mufti: He said that Mufti was clearly anxious  
about the outcome of the partition proposals.  
Mufti said that Arabs were anxious to avoid a  
clash with the British, and that he hoped they  
would remain neutral. He made it clear that if  
action by Arab irregulars would be inevitable if  
the UN approved the partition scheme.

Last Paper.

10611

References.

(Minutes.)

Dr. S. Beir  
Nov. 17  
(BEITH)

L. G. L. Pagan  
17/11

SARS  
17.11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wetherston P.O.  
M.130.  
M 04  
Admby  
A.M.  
Nov 14

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

J. G. Morris/11

30/11/47

Next Paper.

E 10679

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

14 NOV

Mr. Evans,  
No. 820  
12th November, 1947.

D: 10.0 a.m. 13th November, 1947

R: 11.40 a.m. 13th November, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York (Foreign Office please pass as my telegram No.43).  
Cairo,  
Jerusalem,  
British Middle East Office  
Bagdad Saving.  
Jedda "  
Amman "  
Damascus "

Secret.

My telegram No.783. E

Palestine.

Sir Firoz Khan Noon has given me the following indications of an interview he had with the ex-Mufti today.


2. Sir Firoz said that the ex-Mufti was clearly anxious about the outcome of the partition proposals before the United Nations, particularly as he believed the United States Government were now using pressure on other members of the United Nations e.g. China, to support the scheme.

3. The ex-Mufti said that the Arabs were anxious to avoid a clash with the British and that he hoped His Majesty's Government would remain neutral on the partition. He asked Sir Firoz to invite Mr. Jinnah to use his influence with His Majesty's Government to this end. The ex-Mufti made it clear, however, that action by Arab irregulars would be inevitable if the United Nations approved the partition scheme.

4. Sir Firoz told me that he had formed the impression that the ex-Mufti's outlook was no longer anti-British.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York].

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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1947

PALESTINE

14 NOV

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Registry Number

E 10679/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Mr Evans Beirut

822

13. Nov

14 -

Latimer Ex-Mufti - His High Khan Noon. After Beirut tel 820 (E 10648/49/31) informant has since requested that indications as to his intimacies with the ex-Mufti should be treated as strictly confidential and that his name should not be associated with the information.

Last Paper.

10648

(Minutes.)

*[Signature]*  
RE-CABLE

15/11

References.

PART  
15/11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wetheran C.O.  
M.I. 2  
M.I. 4  
Adm  
A.M.  
✓ Nov 15

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*  
15/11

(Index.)

*[Signature]*  
15/11

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

56  
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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans.  
No. 822.

D: 3.58 p.m. 13th November, 1947.

13th November, 1947. R: 4.32 p.m. 13th November, 1947.

Repeated to: U.K. Delegation New York,  
Cairo,  
Jerusalem,  
B.M.E.O. Cairo (Cairo please pass as my  
telegram No. 314,  
Bagdad Saving,  
Amman Saving,  
Damascus Saving,  
Jedda Saving.

SECRET

My telegram No. 820: *Evans*

Palestine.

My informant has since requested that indications  
he gave of his interview with the ex Mufti should be  
treated as strictly confidential and that his name should  
not (repeat not) be associated with the information.

@@@

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14 NOV

14 NOV 1947  
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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10959/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

L. Evans (Beirut)

73 Savoy

14 Nov.

22 Nov.

Interview with Ex. Mufti - Sir FAROZ KHAN NOON.

Refers to Beirut LT 4820 (E 10648/49/31)

During the interview with Sir Faraz Khan Noon, the ex. Mufti discussed intervention by the Arab armies; the possible Arab revolt in Palestine & Arab unity over the question of Palestine.

Last Paper.

E 10679

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

3 h. Matthews (c.o.)

M. I. 3a.

M. O. 4.

Adly.

A. M. Nov 24

(Action completed.)

J.C.M. 2/12

(Index.)

[Signature] 2/12/48

Next Paper.

E 1185

(Minutes.)

The Arab armies which might not take part are presumably those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Lebanon.

[Signature] (J.E. CABRE) 24/11

The Mufti is evidently not entirely satisfied with his treatment by the "Arab Govts."

Mrs. Baird Nov. 25 (BEITH)

L. C. L. Pyman 27/11

[Signature] 29.11

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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1947

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PALESTINE

11185

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28 NOV

Registry Number E11185/49/31/33

FROM British Legation Beirut

No. 157

Dated 24.11.47

Received in Registry 28.11.47

Press Interview given by Grand Mufti

Encloses translation of an article from the Lebanese newspaper "Al Hayat" of 11th November regarding an interview given by the Grand Mufti to correspondents of the American Associated Press.

Last Paper.

10959

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

*J. E. M. 1/12*

(Index.)

*[Handwritten signature]*

Next Paper.

11426

(Minutes.)

*This is not of much interest*

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*(J.E. M. 1/12)*  
*28/11*

*J.B.M.W. 28*

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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No. 57 (34/372/47).

His Majesty's Minister at Beirut  
presents his compliments to Principal Secretary of State for  
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned Foreign  
documents. Affairs

British Legation,  
Beirut.

11185

24th NOV 1947

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of an article appearing in the Lebanese newspaper "Al-Hayat" of November 11th, 1947.	



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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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Translation of an article appearing in the Lebanese newspaper "Al-Hayat" of November 11th, 1947. 62

These are the Arabs and this is their Determination:-

The Grand Mufty declares:-

Neither an International Police nor any Power in the world will prevent us from fighting for the possession of Palestine.

This interview was given by the Grand Mufty to George Bittar and Robert Miller, correspondents of the American Associated Press. These two were accompanied by "Al-Hayat's" representatives. The questions put forward and the Grand Mufty's replies are as follows:-

- Q. What is your opinion of the declaration of H.R.H. Emire Faysal Al-Saoud on the withdrawal of his country from U.N.O. in case the partitioning of Palestine is decided upon?
- A. The declaration of H.R.H. Emire Faysal is only an echo of the sentiments and views of all the Arabs on the subject.
- Q. Will the Arabs oppose the American petroleum projects in the Arab East, in case the American Government continue to support the Zionist Policy? And will the British projects suffer the same fate?
- A. The Arabs have repeatedly announced that they are resolutely determined to repel aggression with all the means at their disposal. Accordingly, they will sacrifice their blood and treasure, body and material, the same as any other people of the earth will do when they find themselves threatened with extermination.
- Q. Do the Arabs regard Russia's pro-partitioning attitude as an unfriendly act, the same as they regard the American Government's attitude towards this question?
- A. The attitude of these two afore-mentioned States is not only unfriendly, but is also unjustifiable morally, and is in violation of the principles and aims championed by these two states and the principles of U.N.O.'s Charter. The Arabs are determined to fight this aggression to the last breath.
- Q. Will the Arabs fight in Palestine in case an international police force comes to take over from the British?
- A. The Arabs are resolutely determined to defend Palestine and every part thereof and no quarter or tenderness would be shown in dealing with any aggression committed by anybody.
- Q. If a war in Palestine is inevitable what will be the fate of the Jewish elements in that country after its occupation by the Arab armies?
- A. I hope that victory will be scored by political experience which is based on the public character and U.N.O.'s Charter, and that this experience will succeed in avoiding war in the Holy Land.
- The Arabs will treat the Jews with justice when an Arab State is established in Palestine, the same as the Americans and British treat them in America and Britain.
- You know that when the Jews were persecuted in Europe, the Arabs gave them a sanctuary in their country and treated them well. The Arabs shall never abandon their noble traditions in this respect, despite the Zionist ingratitude.

Q. The Jews/....

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FO 371 / 51836

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67

Q. The Jews claim that the Arabs who live in the proposed Jewish Section of Palestine will not be deprived of their land, but will enjoy all the rights of the natives (Jewish natives), and therefore partitioning should cause them no apprehension. What is your opinion of this claim, and why the Arabs should oppose partitioning?

A. The Arabs resist the partitioning of Palestine the same as the Americans would resist the establishment of an independent state in, say, California by a group of outsiders who would be imposed upon them by force of arms.

The Arabs are determined to resist the establishment of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine with the same force with which they would resist the establishment of a Jewish state in all of Palestine, because any part of Palestine is equally dear to them, without distinction between this part or that. In their struggle they are supported not by the Arab world alone, but by all the Moslem world.

Concerning the Jewish claim that they will respect the civil rights of the Arab minority in the claimed Jewish state, let me state that we prefer to be exterminated rather than be a minority in our country. If the Zionists, who are a foreign minority which has been imposed upon us, do not accept the status of minority, although they are in an Arab country, why, then, should the Arabs, who are the original owners of the country, be asked to accept a minority status which would be the result of the partitioning of Palestine?

Q. They accuse you of collaboration with the Axis Powers during the last World War. What do you say?

A. When the Arabs endeavoured in vain to persuade the British to desist from imposing a foreign population on Palestine who were coming with the intention of conquering it, they declared resistance, and consequently their villages were destroyed and their organisations were declared to be illegal. Moreover, a number of their leaders were arrested, others were exiled, and the rest took refuge in the neighbouring countries. I was among the last ones, and I took refuge, first in Lebanon, but was compelled to seek refuge in Iraq first, and in Iran next. When the British occupied Iran, Europe was the only refuge available because Turkey refused my request for residing in its territories.

Q. Would you accept to be the President of the Arab Government in an independent Palestine, and what form of government do you propose for Palestine?

A. I personally do not wish to be the head of the Arab Government in Palestine. However, the form of government will be determined by a Constitutional body representing the people.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 21836

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E

11426

4 DEC

1947

PALESTINE

64

Registry Number

E11426/49/31

FROM

Chancery

No.

Amman

Dated

(5/852/46)

Received in Registry

24 Nov  
4 Dec

The Mufti and King Abdullah

transmits note on the recent visit of some Palestinian notables of King Abdullah, on Nov 21. who (according to Amin Pasha) attempted to disguise their real purpose by a series of complaints re activities of the Mufti. Amin believed that considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon them by the Arab High Commission in order to induce them to try and raise the way for a reconciliation between King Abdullah and the Mufti.

Last Paper

11185

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8, Matheson. 80  
Dec. 15

(Action completed)

F. L. M.

(Index)

20/11/46

Next Paper

E 11611

(Minutes.)

Copy to Co. (Matheson)

The second half of para 5 is interesting.

Mr. Cable  
Mr. Beckett Dec 5

Mr. Walker  
(Mr. Walker) 4/12

This is all the more interesting since Amin Pasha has hitherto tried to keep up the pretence that Transjordan was heart and soul with the Arab League in their anti-Jewish plans. It is, therefore, encouraging that he should have told his Arab visitors that the restoration of order in Arab Palestine would be more important than attacks on the Jews.

J. Cable  
(J. Cable)

4/12

Dec 9

L. E. P. Ryan  
5/12

ABH

5.12  
Mr. Walker 9.12

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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SECRET

BRITISH LEGATION,

AMMAN.

24th November, 1947.

(S/352/46).

11426

4 DEC

Dear Secretariat,

We enclose herewith a note on the recent visit of some Palestinian notables to King Abdallah.

We are sending a copy of this note to the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

Yours ever,

AMEAL CHAMBERLAIN



The Secretariat,  
Government Offices,  
JERUSALEM.

✓  
K  
65

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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NOTE

66

On the 21st of November, 1947, Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Sheikh Abdel Qader el Musaffar and Amal Bey Abdel Hadi visited King Abdallah at Shambat Hiaroon.

2. Although the visitors attempted to disguise their real purpose by a series of complaints about the activities of Haj Amin el Husseini and his supporters, Samir Pasha (who was present throughout the talk) believed that considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon them by the Arab Higher Executive in order to induce them to try and pave the way for a reconciliation between the King and the Mufti.

These three individuals were chosen because they were "moderates" and were known to be on good terms with the King.

3. The King's reactions to their opening gambit were so virulent on the subject of Haj Amin that they did not dare to speak to him about their real object. All three, however, hinted to Samir that a common Arab front was imperative and Sheikh el Musaffar, who accompanied Samir back to Amman, went further.

4. The Sheikh asked why it was not possible for the King and the Mufti to pull together.

Samir replied that it was not because of the King's own ambitions on the subject of Palestine, as most people thought, but because the name of Haj Amin was anathema to the Iraq Government with which the Transjordan authorities were determined to co-operate closely. It was natural, therefore, that the King should prefer to work with his nephew and the government of the other half of the Hashimite bloc in preference to the Mufti and the Syrian/Saudi bloc with which Haj Amin was identified.

5. Sheikh el Musaffar then asked what role would be played by the Arab Legion in the event of the Mufti sending bands into Palestine to terrorise his Arab opponents.

Samir replied that it was impossible to reply concisely to hypothetical questions of this kind but, in his opinion, if the British left a vacuum in Palestine, the first role of any authority which entered the Arab areas would be to restore order there; this task would have to take precedence of any steps against the Jews.

6. When speaking to the King, the visitors complained that the Mufti was demanding contributions to the "Beit el Mal" from all well-to-do Palestinians and that these demands were accompanied by threats of violence in the event of non-compliance.

Later on, the King asked His Majesty's Minister if the Palestine authorities would do anything to check this practice. The Minister pointed out that the Mufti was outside the control of the Palestine Government or His Majesty's Government and that the recipients of the demands must themselves take the initiative in appealing to the authorities.

The King replied that they felt, probably rightly, that the Palestine authorities could not protect them from reprisals. He went on to say that if matters became intolerable, they had best take refuge in Transjordan.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 51836

74

1947

E

E 11311

DEC

67

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 1161/49/31

FROM

W. H. H. H. H. H.

No.

Boxwall

Dated

Beirut

Received in Registry

72/67/47

27.11.47

9 rec.

M. H. H.

from various sources for believing it would be advisable to establish some informal contact with the M. H. H. The M. H. H. have already done this.

Last Paper.

11426

(Minutes.)

References.

copy f.o.

M. H. H. sent to re-submit

H.B. 22/12

(Print.)

In P.P. / Postal tel 2403 12/12

Bagdad tel 1295 11/12

H.B. 5/11

(How disposed of.)

Tel, Bagdad 1146

Rptd Beirut 757

Damascus 615

Jedda 513

Dec 8

copy Beirut letter  
to W & M. H. H., C.O.  
Jan. 5

(Action completed.)

J. H. H. 5/11

(Index)

30/1/48

Next Paper.

E 11678

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836



68

3.

town as Beirut it may not be altogether easy to avoid bumping into him). I did have to shun him like the plague in 1940 at Bagdad but times have changed now and I think that it would be all to the good for a member of my staff to see him occasionally. As you know, the Americans in Damascus have of late been seeing quite a bit of Fawzi Qawaqji and Dundas tells me that he also met him at lunch the other day.

The point is that it will now pay us hand over fist to exert any influence we can with a view to avoiding a clash with the Arabs in Palestine, which such hotheads as the Mufti might in their enthusiasm precipitate. The realism, wisdom, goodwill and skill which His Majesty's Government are now applying to the Palestine problem are almost universally appreciated and admired in the Middle East. And it could only enhance our position if we were to give this further proof of broadmindedness by showing that His Majesty's Government will not stoop to shewing themselves vindictive towards an individual. It would not mean, nor could it be taken to imply, that His Majesty's Government had abandoned their principles or condoned the Mufti's misguided past. In fact if, as may be the case, he has had a change of heart, mild and discreet contacts with the British might give him a chance to prove it. If the leopard is still the same we shall soon find the spots under his henna.

I am sending copies of this letter to Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Damascus, Jedda, Jerusalem and the British Middle East Office.

*Yours truly*

*W. Stewart Tomes*

*F.S. Since the foregoing was drafted, we hear that the United States, Asst. Military Attaché, Haystack, called on the Mufti the other day.*

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 51836**

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11511

British Legation,

*enter soon E*

*69*

72/67/47.

DEC BEIRUT.

SECRET.

27th November, 1947.

*My dear Burrows,*

Since my return I have been considering the problem of the ex-Mufti's presence in Beirut and the advisability of establishing some informal contact with him. There is little doubt that the ex-Mufti no longer regards us as Arab Public Enemy No. 1 and to this extent he represents less of a menace from our point of view.

The danger of Arab intervention in Palestine while the British forces are there is still real. If a decision unfavourable to the Arabs is reached at the United Nations or if serious clashes between the Palestine Arabs and the Jews occur it is probable that the ex-Mufti will be exposed to pressure from his extremist followers to intervene and that he might himself be tempted to precipitate events in the hope of increasing his own prestige. Contact even of a most informal sort with British officials might serve as a safety valve and it is not inconceivable that a moderating influence might be exerted on him (there are indications that he has mellowed somewhat) or failing that it should be possible at least to obtain some first hand evidence of his intentions.

I realise that the ex-Mufti's dubious past renders the prospect of even unofficial contact with him

*/distasteful....*

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE,  
S.W. 1.

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 51836**

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2.

distasteful and also that the Iraqis whose distrust and dislike continue unabated may not relish any contact however unofficial between the British authorities and the ex-Mufti. Such contact may also to some extent strengthen his hand, which again might not please the Iraqis. It cannot however be denied that he enjoys very considerable prestige and influence and he may still play a part in the future government of Palestine. Whatever his faults, the ex-Mufti has had no truck with the Soviets - he learnt a lesson through backing the wrong side in the last war - and advantage might be taken of his anti-Communist leanings at some future date. Of more immediate significance however as suggested above is the fact that, whether the Iraqis like it or not, his views will probably have considerable weight in connexion with any decisions regarding Arab reaction to an unfavourable United Nations Organisation decision because he can still sway the people of Palestine. For these reasons and as seen from here it appears doubtful whether we can afford to continue to ignore him completely. As regards the Iraqis, I feel, subject to the views of Bagdad, that no harm would be done provided eventual contacts are discreet.

Shortly after the ex-Mufti's arrival here the Lebanese Prime Minister suggested to Evans that he might like to meet him at tea at his (Riad Bey's) house. Evans was of course most non-committal and Riad Bey has not reverted to the point. I should be glad of your views on whether if such an opportunity occurs again advantage should be taken of it. I do not of course propose that I should go out of my way myself to see him (but in such a small

/town ...

24

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61836

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Registry  
No.

72167/4731

OUT FILE

Date

8/12

71

Despatched

8 53 P

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Tel

Bagdad 1146

Amin 548

BME 0 865

Rep Beirut 757

615 Damascus

513 Hedda

Jerusalem

Clear

Dept No 1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(247 (A728) Wt. 11489-144 250m 5/47 G.S.St.)

5.87

~~72167~~

Tel No 1146 8<sup>th</sup> Dec and 16

Add to Bagdad to Amin an  
BME O ref to Beirut

Damascus, Hedda, Jerusalem.

Honstoun - Bowwall's.

Letter 72167/47 of  
Nov 27. [Mufti].

Pl. telegraph your views.

SABBS

8.12

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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INWARD TELEGRAM  
11611 / 49 / 31

Enter.  
20 E  
73

Cypher (O.T.P.)

DEC 13 1947

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 12th December, 1947.

R. 12th " " 18.10 hrs.

INDEXED

No. 2403 Top Secret.

Addressed to the S. of S.  
Repeated to Cairo No. 157 (please pass to  
B.M.E.O.)  
" " Baghdad No. 96.  
" " Beirut No. 1750.  
" by savingram to Amman No. 296.  
" " " " Damascus No. 1752.  
" " " " Jedda No. 102.

Begins.

Houston-Boswall's letter 72/67/47 of  
27th November to Burrows.

Mufti.

I support Houston-Boswall's arguments in favour  
of discreet informal contact with the Mufti. It will, of course,  
be very necessary that the Jews should not get wind of any such  
contact. Ends.

Distributed to:-

R. 243  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. Rees-Williams  
Sir S. Caine  
Sir C. Jeffries  
Mr. Holding

Foreign Office  
" "  
" "

Mr. Martin  
Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Gutch  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Hignam  
Mr. Holmer  
Mr. Galsworthy  
Mr. Dale  
Mr. Beeley.  
Mr. Keith.  
Mr. Burrows.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 51836

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75

E

11678 75

PALESTINE

10 DEC

Registry Number

E11678/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir D Kirkbride

No.

Amman

Dated

Received in Registry

371  
9.12.10

The Mufti

The Mufti is a power in the Middle East, consequently agrees with Mauter's belief, that we can gain nothing by imposing a Boycott.

Refer to Lt 548 (E11611/49/31)

Last Paper.

11611

(Minutes.)

Await replies from Cairo, Baghdad and BMEO.

References.

by G.O.

H.B. 12/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 80. (on E11611/49/31)  
✓ Jan. 5.

(Action completed.)

G. Gilbert

(Index)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

E11989

30471 F.O.P

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

*E 76*

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No. 371  
9th December, 1947

D. 12.00 a.m. 9th December, 1947  
R. 2.44 p.m. 9th December, 1947

SECRET

Your telegram No. 548.

*E 11311/40/31*

11378

The Mufti is a power in the Middle East <sup>10 DEC</sup>  
we like it or not and that being so I agree with the  
Minister Beirut that we gain nothing by imposing a boycott.

888



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Reference: **FO 371 / 61836**

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E

E 11989

1247

PALESTINE

17 DEC

Registry Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

E 11989/49/31

Grifford Smith

80

t. M. Bealey

16 DEC

17

Proposed approach to the Mufti.

Enclosed copy of Palestine 2437 of 15 p.c. in which H.C. discusses measures for the prevention of the riots between Arabs and Jews the papers that an approach be made to the Mufti. 80 would like the name of the 40 in this.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

Dealt with by telephone

References.

~~by c.c.~~

H.B. 27/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

J.L.M. 1/1

~~by c.c.~~  
27/12

Next Paper.

E 12033

29470 F.O.P.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836





TOP SECRET

17 DEC

The Church House,  
Great Smith Street,  
London, S.W.1.

*Edna*

*78*

My Reference

December 16th, 1947.

Your Reference

*My Dear Harold*

*already  
entered  
E*

As agreed in our telephone conversation, I enclose a copy of the High Commissioner's immediate top secret and personal telegram No. 2437 about reprisals and counter-reprisals in Palestine. I have not submitted to higher authority here the question whether the Colonial Office would favour approaching the Mufti as the High Commissioner proposes, but off-hand I cannot see any reason why not. I think we should wish to have the views of the Foreign Office before finally making up our minds, more especially as the High Commissioner proposes to bring pressure on the Arab League.

In this connection you will remember the recent telegram from Houston-Boswell making much the same suggestion.

Will you please let us have your views as soon as you can in order that we may reply suitably to the High Commissioner?

*Your ever*  
*Trafford Smith*  
(Trafford Smith)

H. Beeley, Esq., CBE.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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INWARD TELEGRAM

Entered  
17 E

79

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 15th December, 1947.

R. 15th " " 21.50 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2437 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed to the S. of S.  
Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York  
No. (71893)

(Washington please pass).  
" " Cairo No. 158.

I have reported previously, repeated assurances given by the Arabs that they were most anxious to not make trouble for us while we were still here. It is now clear in Palestine, however, much as they have wished, leaders either cannot or will not take firm steps to control the present disorders. It is known that the Arab Higher Committee have made efforts to this end, but it is suspected that these efforts have been sabotaged by certain individuals in Palestine acting independently.

2. Situation now is deteriorating into a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals between Jews and Arabs, in which many innocent lives are being lost, the tempo of which may accelerate. I must state that the provocative action of the Jews and their admission that Hagana is authorised to take what they call counter-action, but what is, in effect, indiscriminate action against any Arab, is hardly calculated to have a calming effect.

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 51836**

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INWARD TELEGRAM

81

excuse escaped vociferous and hysterical accusations by Jews that we were a people who were prone to brutal reprisals. Now they have themselves come out with reprisals of a kind which would not even have crossed the mind of any soldier here, and which are an offence to civilization.

As I have said we will continue pressure on them here, but I would urge the Government that every means should be explored outside Palestine to cause them to cease. I would suggest that there may be opportunities at United Nations and in America where action could be taken.

Distributed to:-

R. 243  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. Rees-Williams  
Sir S. Caine  
Sir C. Jeffries  
Mr. Holding  
Mr. Martin

Foreign Office  
" "

Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Gutch  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Higham  
Mr. Holmer  
Mr. Galsworthy  
Mr. Dale

- Mr. Burrows.  
- Mr. Beeley.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 81836

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E 12033

18 DEC

82

Registry Number

E 12033/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

B. H. F. O.

No.

608

Dated

16 Dec.

Received in Registry

18 Dec.

The Briefs.

Refers to L. Houston Bowwall's letter of Nov 27 (E 11611/49/31) There is no harm in contact being made with the briefs socially & casually. Official contact should be avoided.

Last Paper.

E 11989

(Minutes.)

HB 227/12

References.

E 11611/49/31

begin f.o.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, P.D. (on E 11611/49/31) Jan. 5

(Action completed.)

G. W. M. S. 1

(Index.)

[Signature] 20/1/48

Next Paper.

E 12038

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61836

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

13 DEC

FROM BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE, CAIRO TO  
FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 608

D. 8.54 a.m. December 17th, 1947.

December 16th, 1947.

R. 9.55 a.m. December 17th, 1947.

Repeated to Arab Posts

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 608  
December 16th, repeated to Arab posts.

Following from Clayton.

Houstoun Boswall's letter 72/67/47 to Mr. Burrows  
and Jerusalem telegram No. 2045 to Secretary of State.

My views, for what they are worth, are that I see  
no harm and some advantage in some contact with the  
Mufti made socially and preferably casually. I should  
have thought though that [grp. undec. ? anything]  
approaching official contact such as a call on him or  
receiving visits from him should still be avoided. Do  
not know Syrian and Lebanese feelings towards him but  
Iraqis and Transjordanians as well as many Palestinians  
have very bitter feelings towards him and he will not  
be slow to try and build himself up at the expense of  
our friends by posing as having our support.

SSSSS

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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98

E

E 12038

1947

PALESTINE

19 DEC

84

Registry Number

E 12038/49/31

TELEGRAM FROM

S. H. F. O.

No.

611

Dated

17 Dec.

Received in Registry

19 Dec.

Proposed approach to the hufte.

Refers to Jerusalem tel to 2437 (E 11989/49/31)  
Suggests that present disorders may delay evacuation  
would be best argument to use in trying to get  
the hufte to take action. Aggans Pasha might reason  
with the hufte or he might be approached  
through unofficial channels.

Last Paper.

E 12033

(Minutes.)

213. 22/12

References.

copy G.D.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 80. (on E 11611/49/31)  
✓ Jan 5.

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*

(Index.)

*[Signature]*  
20/1/48

Next Paper.

E 12124

30471 F.O.P.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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12038

E

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

19 DEC  
FROM BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE, CAIRO,  
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

85

No. 611

D. 12.30 p.m. 18th December, 1947.

17th December, 1947.

R. 1.25 p.m. 18th December, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem  
United Kingdom Delegation,  
New York  
Washington

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 611 of December 17th: repeated to Jerusalem, United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and Washington.

11989/49/31

Jerusalem telegram No. 2437 to Secretary of State.

In the past few days there have been several requests from Arab leaders that our evacuation should be speeded up as much as possible. Suggestion, therefore, that present disorders might delay the evacuation may be best argument to use in trying to get the Mufti to take action.

2. It would, I think, be possible to get Azzam Pasha to reason with the Mufti on these lines, or alternatively, it could be done through entirely unofficial channels as, for example, by one of the few correspondents who are in frequent touch with him.

3. Opinion on the part of the Arabs was theoretically opposed to early Arab activity but in their hearts they are not displeased at the outbreaks as showing to the world that Jewish assertions that the Arabs would take partition lying down were false.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 377 and 61 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and Washington.]

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Reference:

FO 371 / 51836

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12124

87  
END

Cypher/OTP

22 DEC DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Bask.  
No. 1321.

D. 9.50 a.m. 20th December, 1947.

20th December,  
1947.

R. 10.50 a.m. 20th December, 1947.

Repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo, Beirut,  
and Saving Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus  
and Jedda.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1321 of  
December 20th, repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo,  
Beirut and Saving Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus and Jedda.

Your telegram No. 1146. *re*

I am inclined to doubt if we are likely to be able to exercise much influence on the Mufti by contacting him and it is certain that anything approaching official contact would cause deplorable impression in royal and governmental circles here. The Iraqi Prime Minister and Nuri Pasha have as far as I know avoided all contact with him.

2. Even informal contact could hardly remain secret for long and the move would probably be interpreted here as evidence of our weakness, of our disregard of the feelings of our ally and as one more proof of our alleged tendency to appease our enemies at the expense of our friends.

3. Nevertheless I think we could get away with the proposal on condition:

- (a) that contact be the Oriental Secretary and not His Majesty's Minister;
- (b) that it be on neutral ground;
- (c) that I be informed immediately it takes place.

I would then inform His Royal Highness and the Prime Minister privately that such chance meetings might be useful in enabling us to ascertain what the Mufti was planning and to exercise some influence on him.

333



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Reference: FO 371 / 61836

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